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JURISDICTION 
The Court has Jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to § 78-2-2(a) and § 78-2a-(2)(j), 
U.C.A. (1953). 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
L Where the State has conferred jurisdiction of a cause of action upon State district 
courts, may it withhold jurisdiction of that cause from the federal district court in cases of 
diversity of citizenship? Preserved: Response to Motion to Dismiss, July 6,2006; Ruling 
and Order, October 5, 2006, at 7; Notice of Appeal. 
2. May the District Court gratuitously assert failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies where (a) no party so claims, (b) neither the court nor the parties can identify 
any such remedy not exhausted, and (c) all remedies provided by the pertinent code have 
been exhausted? 
Preserved: Ruling and Order, October 5, 2006, at 11-13; Notice of Appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues present only questions of law. Review is de novo, without deference to the 
views of the District Court. Colonial Leasing v. Farm Bros. Construction Co., 731 P.2d. 
483 (Utah 1998). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
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Plaintiffs filed this action in the United States District Court, District of Utah, 
within 30 days of a decision of Park City Municipal Corporation, at the request of East 
West Partners and United Park City Mines Co., to landlock property of plaintiffs, 
preventing its development, in violation of a Park City Ordinance. The action seeks a 
declaration of invalidity of the City's decision upon the grounds of failure of 
compliance with the Ordinance and unconstitutional discrimination. 
The United States District Court found that it had jurisdiction of the matter based upon 
diversity of citizenship, but abstained on the ground the matter was better decided by a 
State court. It did so without prejudice to re-file in the State District Court, which was 
promptly done. 
The Third District Court, on Motion to Dismiss, found that §10-9-1001 (2)(a), 
U.C.A. (1953) disallows filing of such matters in the federal court; thus, subsequent 
filing in the State Court following abstention was untimely. Further, though nowhere 
raised in the Motion to Dismiss, the District Court found that plaintiff had failed to 
exhaust administrative remedies. The Court did not resort to the Park City Code to 
determine remedies available. It was not able to identify any remedies not exhausted. 
The District Court dismissed the Complaint by Ruling and Order, October 5,2006, Notice 
of Appeal was timely filed October 30, 2006. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On Motion to Dismiss, the facts are as alleged in the Complaint, as follows: 
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L Plaintiff are the owners of land within the municipal limits of Park City, 
generally denominated the Marsac Lode, Lot No. 61, aggregating approximately five 
acres. 
2. The Marsac Lode has been included by Park City in an eighty-four acre 
development zone, generally denominated the "Mountain Village", as a part of a Master 
Planned Development ("MPD"). The remainder of land included in said zone belongs to 
UPCM, or its successor East West. Though all land within the "Mountain Village" is 
identically zoned, Park City asserts that no land within said zone is entitled to the 
development permitted by such zone except land belonging to UPCM or its successors. 
3. Historically, the Mountain Village area has been accessible from the remainder of 
Park City by State Road 224 ("SR224"), sometimes called Marsac Avenue. 
4. In 2002, in order to maximize developability of its land within the Mountain 
Village, UPCM, without permission from plaintiffs, relocated SR224 so that it bisected 
the Marsac claim, severing the southeastern approximately two acres thereof from the 
remainder. 
5. UPCM then dedicated the relocated SR224 to the Utah Department of 
Transportation ("UDOT"), which instituted negotiations with plaintiffs regarding 
acquisition of title to maintain SR224 as relocated across the Marsac Claim. 
6. Construction of SR224 across the Marsac claim created steep embankments and 
other impediments to access, which render the southeast extension of the Marsac Claim 
inaccessible, except through the property of UPCM. 
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7. All land within the Mountain Village is subject to the burden to provide access to 
adjoining land imposed by § 15-7.3-4, Park City Land Management Code. 
8. May 25, 2005, the Park City Planning Commission, over the objections of 
plaintiffs, under § 15-7.3-4, PCLMC, approved the subdivision of UPCM's land 
adjoining the Marsac Claim on the southeast, and known as Village at Empire Pass (Pod 
A ) West Side. 
9. May 26, 2005, the City Council of Park City, over the objection of plaintiffs under 
§ 15-7,3-4, PCLMC, approved the Village at Empire Pass (Pod A) West Side. 
10. As a result of said approval, the Marsac Claim has been rendered inaccessible 
and un- developable, despite §15-7.3-4, PCLMC, as follows: 
Proposed streets shall be extended to the boundary lines of the tract to be 
subdivided, unless prevented by topography or other physical conditions, or unless 
in the opinion of the Planning Commission such an extension is not necessary for 
the coordination of the layout of the subdivision with the existing layout of the 
most advantageous future development of adjoining tracts. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is unclear whether § 10-9-1001 (2)(a), U.C.A. (1953) intends that actions to review 
municipal land use decisions be filed only in State district courts. It is a familiar 
principle, however, that a statute will not be given a construction which is 
unconstitutional, where a constitutional construction is available. 
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Read to exclude the filing of such actions in the federal district court under its 
diversity jurisdiction, § 10-9-1001 (2)(a) is unconstitutional. Under the Supremacy 
Clause, states lack power to interfere with the jurisdiction of federal courts. 
The federal district court, as it found, had jurisdiction of this matter upon filing. 
Such filing, therefore, tolled the running of any statute of limitations. Plaintiffs did not 
need to show "equitable tolling". 
The District Court's gratuitous finding of failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies is simply misinformed. 
What constitute remedies in a municipal planning proceeding is determined by the 
municipal code, not the State code. The Park City Land Management Code provides that 
decisions of the Planning Commission respecting MPDs, may be appealed to the City 
Council. There is no appeal beyond the City Council with respect to MPD's. The 
Complaint here recites that plaintiffs objected to the Planning Commission, then appealed 
to the City Council. This exhausted the available remedies. 
ARGUMENT 
THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION 
The District Court's Order cites two grounds: (1) limitation of filings to the State 
District Court, and (2) failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The second is a false 
issue. Neither the District Court nor defendants can point to any administrative remedy 
not exhausted. The same claim had been raised before, and rejected by the U.S. District 
Court. There are no unexhausted administrative remedies in this case. 
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The first ground raises the only substantive issue in this case: may the State, by 
statute, limit the jurisdiction of federal courts, in cases of diversity of citizenship, to hear 
state law causes of action? The District Court holds that §10-9-1001 (2) (a) U.C.A. 
(1953) limits the remedy to State District Courts. The answer to the question raised, 
however, said to be "axiomatic" and "well-established" is "no". No such State 
limitation is valid. 
It is not questioned that as a ground rule the jurisdiction of federal courts over 
cases within the field of their jurisdiction cannot be enlarged, diminished or 
impaired by state statutes or regulations; and a person may not be deprived of his 
right to resort to the federal courts by state regulation. 
Sacramento Municipal Utility District v. Pacific Gas and Elect. Co.. 128 P.2d. 529, 532 
(Calif. 1942). 
I am of opinion that the defendant, as a third class city of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, situate in this district, is amendable to suit in this court, provided the 
plaintiffs status is such as to establish diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff 
and the defendant under Article III, Section 2 of the federal Constitution and the 
laws of congress passed in pursuance thereof. It is true that the statue of 
Pennsylvania relating to cities of third class which lie in more than one county 
provides that such cities "shall * * * be deemed and considered as under and 
within the jurisdiction of the courts of that county in which is situate the borough 
first incorporated of those forming such consolidated borough." P.L. 1931, 1932 § 
211, 53 P.S.Pa. § 12198-211. Defendant argues from this fact that the city of 
Bethlehem, being such a city as is referred in the above mentioned statute, is 
suable only in the state courts of Northampton County. I do not so conclude. The 
various states of the Union fix by statute the jurisdiction of their own courts and 
the venue of suits brought in those courts. Whenever an action is commenced in 
the state courts, the proceedings therein must conform to the requirements of the 
state statutes. It is otherwise in the respect of the proceedings commenced in or 
removed to district court of the United States. There, if the matter in controversy 
exceeds three thousands in value and the suit is brought to Federal Court on the 
ground of diverse citizenship, the only questions to be answered, if there be only 
one plaintiff and one defendant, are: (1) Are the plaintiff and defendant citizens 
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of different states? And (2) is the defendant a resident in the district in which the 
action was commenced? 
Mr. Garrvv. Citv of Bethlehem. 45 F.Supp. 385, 385-386 (E.D. Pa. 1942). 
The narrow issue before the court is whether the exclusive grant of original 
jurisdiction to the state district courts over tort claims brought against counties, 
municipalities and their officers prevents a federal district court from hearing such 
claims pursuant to its pendent jurisdiction. I hold that section 41-4-18, N.M. 
Stat.Ann. (1982 Repl. Pamp), which purports to confine exclusive original 
jurisdiction for any claim under Tort Claims Act to the district courts of New 
Mexico, is unconstitutional to the extent it acts to limit pendent jurisdiction of a 
federal district court over tort claims against counties, municipalities, and their 
officers 
Once the state legislature waives sovereign immunity for counties and 
municipalities and provides for enforcement of rights and remedies in the state 
courts, it may not prevent the adjudication of these rights and remedies in a federal 
district court if that court has jurisdiction under the constitution and laws of the 
United States. It is axiomatic that, pursuant to the supremacy clause, article III 
preempts any contrary state law. Section 41-4-18, therefore, is unconstitutional to 
the extent it attempts to confine suits against New Mexico counties municipalities, 
or county and municipal officers to New Mexico state district court and will not 
have the effect of limiting the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. 
Woiciechowski v. Harriman. 607 F.Supp. 631, 633, 635 (D.N.M. 1985). 
The remaining issue is whether this Court lacks jurisdiction over this suit under 
Ohio law. The enabling statute for the OTC provides, in pertinent part: 
[t]he Ohio Turnpike Commission may do any of the following: 
# * * * * * 
(4) Sue and be sued in its own name, plead and be impleaded, provided any 
actions against the commission shall be brought in the common court of pleas 
of the county in which the principal office of the commission is located, or in 
the court of common pleas in the county in which the cause of action arose if 
that county is located within this state.. . . 
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It is well-settled that states can cloak themselves and the entities they create in 
sovereign immunity. However, once a state elects to make a state-created entity 
subject to suit, the entity is subject to provisions of Article III, § 2 of the United 
States Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) giving the federal courts 
jurisdiction over claims between citizens of different states 
Here, Ohio chose to make the OTC liable to suit. It cannot by statute subsequently 
divest this Court of its diversity jurisdiction over the OTC. Therefore, this Court 
concludes that the dispute is appropriately before it. 
Wildner Contracting Co.. Inc. v. Ohio Turnpike Commission. 913, F. Supp. 1031, 1037 
(N.D. Ohio 1996). 
Even if it could be shown that § 10-9-100 l(2)(a) intended to limit jurisdiction to 
State District Courts, the statute could not do so. The constitutional interpretation of § 
10-9-100 l(2)(a) is that it permits filing in any district court having jurisdiction, including 
a federal district court having diversity jurisdiction. 
The statute of limitations contained in § 10-9-100 l(2)(a) could not run after the 
action was filed in a court having jurisdiction. 
EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES 
The District Court rules that, though the Motion before it did not raise the matter, 
the "plain error doctrine" (citing State v. Morrison. 937 P.2d. 1293,1296 (U. App. 1997)) 
allowed the Court to find that plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies. 
This was plain error. 
It did not occur to the District Court that the matter was not raised in the Motion 
because it could not be. There were no administrative remedies to exhaust. This was 
fully plead in the Complaint. 
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Notwithstanding the general rule of §10-9-405, U.C.A. (1953), the specific rule of 
the Park City Land Management Code ("PCLMC") is that matters of compliance with the 
code regarding Master Planned Developments are addressed in the first instance to the 
Planning Commission- An appeal from the decisions of the Planning Commission will lie 
to the City Council. No further appeals will lie. PCLMC §15-1-18 (c). The Complaint in 
this case states with particularly that objection was made to the Planning Commission, 
followed by appeal to the City Council. While it does not state that no further appeals 
were available, this was amply sufficient to show exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
Defendants did not raise the matter because there was nothing to raise. 
The foregoing matter was attempted to be explained to the District Court at 
hearing, as reflected in note 5 of the Ruling and Order. At hearing plaintiff challenged 
defendants to identify any remedy not exhausted; they could not. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The District Court ruling was in error on both of the matters asserted in support. 
The ruling should be promptly reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 22nd day of February, 2007. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN 
FONDS and STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FONDS, N e t h e r l a n d s 
a s s o c i a t i o n s , 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
v s . 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION, EAST WEST 
PARTNERS, and UNITED PARK CITY 
MINES CO., 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 0 6 0 5 0 0 1 9 0 
J u d g e BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: O c t o b e r 5 , 2 0 0 6 
Defendants. 
The above matter came before the court on October 2, 2006, 
for oral argument on motion of United Park City Mines (United 
Park) to dismiss. Plaintiffs (Mayflower) were present through E. 
Craig Smay, Park City and East West Partners (East West)were 
present through Mark R. Gaylord, and United Park was present 
through Robert S. Campbell, Clark K. Taylor, Stephen K. 
Christiansen. 
United Park filed this motion on May 26, 2006. It was 
joined by Park City on June 8, 2006, and joined by East West on 
July 10, 2006. United Park filed a request to submit on July 5, 
2006, asserting plaintiffs had not filed an opposition. On that 
same day, plaintiffs requested a hearing, asserting they had not 
received the motion. The next day, July 6, 200 6, plaintiffs 
filed a response to the motion. United Park filed a motion to 
strike that response on July 18, 2006. Plaintiffs filed an 
objection to the request to submit on July 19, 2006. United Park 
filed no reply. A restated request to submit was filed by United 
Park on July 18, 2006. The court then scheduled oral argument 
and thereafter took the matter under advisement. 
The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties heard 
oral argument, and concludes as follows. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs filed this complaint April 19, 2006. In summary 
Mayflower seeks a declaration that Park City's approval of United 
Park's Village at Empire Pass, (Pod A) West Side, discriminates 
against Mayflower's land and violates the Park City Land 
Management Code (Code) and the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. Mayflower owns land. Claim No. 61, of the Marsac 
Lode, and that has been included by Park City in a development 
known at Mountain Village. Some lands belong to United Park or 
its successor East West. Though all the land is identically 
zoned, Park City has maintained no land may be developed except 
that which belongs to United Park or its successors. In 2002 
United Park relocated SR 224, the access road, so it bisects the 
Maisac claim, severing two acres from the remainder, and that was 
done without permission of Mayflower. United Park then dedicated 
the relocated SR 224 to the Utah Department of Transportation 
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(UDOT) . That relocated road created steep embankments which 
impede access and render a portion of Mayflower's land 
inaccessible except across United Park's land. 
As causes of action, Mayflower claims Park City approved the 
subdivision of United Park's land adjoining the Marsac Claim in 
May 2005. This violates the Park City Code, section 15-7.3-4, 
which provides that proposed streets shall be extended to the 
boundary lines of the tract to be subdivided unless topography 
prevents that or the Planning Commission finds it is not 
necessary-
Park City filed an answer on May 30, 2006, and later joined 
in the motion to dismiss filed by United Park. East West also 
filed an answer July 10, 2006, and joined in the motion to 
dismiss the same day. 
ARGUldENTS 
United Park moves to dismiss under URCP, Rule 12(b) (6). If 
it appears plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any 
set of facts pleaded, such a motion may be granted. 
United Park claims this complaint is really an appeal of a 
land planning decision of Park City made in May 2005. A land 
planning decision is subject to review under the Municipal Land 
Use Development and Management Act, MLUDMA.. A petition for 
judicial review must be made withing 30 days of final action, or 
-3-
by June 2005. 
Historically, Mayflower filed a complaint in United States 
District Court on June 22, 2005. That was dismissed by that court 
in April, 2006. This complaint followed within a few days. That 
mistaken filing does not toll the limitations period of MLUDMA. 
Moreover, the complaint does not state a claim that the Park 
City decision violates either the Due Process or Equal Protection 
clauses of the United States or Utah Constitutions. 
Mayflower is said to have no claim of entitlement to a 
state-created right. Park City had and has legitimate discretion 
to deny Mayflower'' s proposed use. If there is no invidious 
discrimination, such as on racial grounds, a planning decision is 
a matter for the state and does not implicate the State of 
Federal Constitution. Thus, the review is limited to whether the 
decision was arbitrary or capricious. Mayflower does not even 
claim it had a legitimate claim of entitlement, and they could 
not prove such even if they made the claim. Mayflower was not 
entitled to a denial of the Village at Empire Pass' right of 
development. Mayflower has not alleged, and could not prove, that 
Park City lacked discretion in approving the Village at Empire 
Pass. 
The complaint has alleged invidious discrimination, but no 
facts could be shown that would entitle plaintiffs to relief. 
There is no racial animus or other stereotyping that would allow 
-4-
such a claim to stand. 
As to the equal protection claim, there must be membership 
in a particular group before a decision of a decision-maker could 
violate another's equal protection rights. That has not been 
alleged nor could it be proven. 
Further, the complaint alleges MLUDMA has been violated, and 
it is cited as OCA .10-9-405. The statute has been renumbered and 
thus the complaint fails to give notice and should be dismissed. 
Mayflower filed a response and urges that the federal court 
dismissed the case based on principles of abstention rather than 
the merit of the allegations as such. The dismissal of the 
federal court action was without prejudice to proceeding in state 
court, where the State interests were stated to be paramount. 
The case was filed in a district court where it remained, as a 
challenge to the Park City decision, until the federal court 
dismissed it not on the merits but on abstention grounds. Thus, 
no time limits for seeking review were missed. 
As to the merits, Mayflower agrees it has never asserted it 
was entitled to a denial of United Park's project. Mayflower 
asserts that its own land in the same development zone has been 
denied development rights, and that is the unlawful conduct. 
Mayflower claims Park City and United Park contracted and agreed 
that Park City would allow United Park to develop land but no one 
-5-
else could do so without United Park's consent. That has not been 
denied for purposes of this motion. 
The complaint does allege invidious discrimination, and 
"group" discrimination may be inferred: the discrimination is 
against non-resident, foreign investors. Plaintiff need not 
prove discrimination at this point. Park City allowed one of two 
land owners to develop, and both are similarly situated, and a 
claim is thus stated for relief. 
The statute cited, MLUDMA, was numbered as Mayflower pleaded 
it at the time of the events, and so a re-numbering is not 
defective and United Park's argument is called by plaintiff 
"comic relief.If 
DISCUSSION 
"A Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged 
in the complaint but challenges the plaintiff's right to relief 
based on those facts." Oakwood Vill. L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 
2004 UT 101 1 8, 104 P. 3d 1226. The purpose of a motion to 
dismiss "is to challenge the formal sufficiency of the claim for 
relief, not to establish the facts or resolve the merits of a 
case." Whipple v. Am. Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 
(Utah 1996) . "A dismissal is a severe measure and should be 
granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is 
not entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be 
-6-
proved in support of its claim. " Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.T 
795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). 
The threshold d ispute of the p a r t i e s i s whether Mayflower's 
claims are barred by MLUDMA's s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n p r o v i s i o n , 
Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-1001(2) ( a ) . 1 That p r o v i s i o n s t a t e s 
that : 
Any person adversely affected by any decision 
made in the exercise of or in violation of the 
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for 
review of the decision with the district court 
within 30 days after the local decision is 
rendered. 
Mayflower does not dispute that the current action was filed 
in this court more than 30 days after the alleged violation, but 
maintains that because it' filed the action in federal district 
court within 30 days, it's right to review is protected. 
Mayflower correctly notes that the federal court did not. find 
that the matter had been filed in the "wrong" court, but simply 
found that the matter was best heard in state court and therefore 
abstained from hearing the matter. 
The issue remains, however, whether filing the matter in 
federal court satisfied § 10-9-1001(2)(a) or, alternatively, 
whether the federal filing tolled the limitations period. The 
court is not convinced that filing in federal district court 
1
 The parties dispute whether the 2004 version or the 2005 
version of the statute applies. Although the Court cites the 
2004 version because the violation purportedly occurred in 2004, 
the analysis and result would be the same under either version. 
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satisfied rhe statute of limitations. Mayflower contends that 
the matter "has always been in a court having jurisdiction, " 
referring to the federal district court and then this court. 
However, § 10-9-1001(2)(a) does not allow the petition to be 
filed in "a court having jurisdiction," but requires that the 
petition be filed with "the district court" (emphasis added). In 
addition to this plain language, it is important to note that the 
provision is part of a comprehensive state scheme regarding 
municipal land use development and management. The context of 
the provision in a comprehensive state land use scheme supports a 
finding that ^the district court" refers to the state district 
court where the decision is made by a land use body, not a 
federal district court or some other district court in, for 
example, another state or even another county. Mayflower offers 
no authority or argument for finding that AAthe district court" 
includes a federal district court and this court declines to 
interpret it in such a fashion. Therefore, Mayflower's filing in 
federal district court did not satisfy the 30 day filing period. 
The remaining question, then, is whether the limitations 
period was tolled. Mayflower does not contend that the statutory 
tolling provision in § 10-9-1001(2) (a) applies, and indeed, it 
does not. Therefore, if the limitations period is to be tolled, 
it must be through equitable tolling. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently noted that "[n]o Utah court 
-8-
has ever found occasion to equitably toll a limitations period 
when there has not first been a demonstration that the party 
seeking the tolling could invoke the discovery rule due to an 
excusable delay in discovering the underlying claim before the 
limitations period expired." Beaver County v. Property Tax 
Division of the Utah State Tax Commissionr 2006 DT 6 I 29, 128 
P.3d 1187. It is undisputed in this case that Mayflower knew of 
the claimed violation prior to the expiration of the limitations 
period and therefore the discovery rule does not apply. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not held that equitable 
tolling is never available outside of the discovery rule context, 
it has stated that it is a "high bar" for "those seeking such 
extraordinary relief to hurdle." Beaver County, 2006 UT at 1 29. 
To meet this hurdle, Mayflower must show "exceptional 
circumstances where the application of the general rule would be 
'irrational7 or ^unjust.7" Estes v. The Honorable Don V. Tibbs, 
1999 UT 52 5 5, 979 P. 2d 823 (quoting Sevy v. Security Title Co., 
902 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995). 
Mayflower does not cite a single case from any jurisdiction 
showing that filing in a federal district court that subsequently 
abstains from hearing the matter should toll the limitations 
period.2 Although this Court7 s own research uncovered at least 
2
 Indeed, Mayflower does not cite one case anywhere in its 
hriefing in support of any of its arguments. Such lack of 
citation is surprising where Mayflower contends both the federal 
-9-
one such c a s e , 3 t h i s c o u r t does not f i n d t h a t M a y f l o w e r ' s 
c i i cumstances warrant ' ' e x c e p t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s " a s r e q u i r e d 
under Utah law. 
In Beaver County, t h e Utah S t a t e Tax Commission d e t e r m i n e d 
tha t i t could e q u i t a b l y t o l l t h e s t a t u t o r y p e r i o d on i s s u i n g 
escaped p r o p e r t y t a x e s t o a l low i t s P r o p e r t y Tax D i v i s i o n t o 
i s sue an assessment a g a i n s t a u t i l i t y company. Beaver County, 
2006 UT a t I I . The Commission e q u i t a b l y t o l l e d t h e p e r i o d ou t 
of f a i r n e s s t o c o u n t i e s who had i n t e r v e n e d b e c a u s e t h e c o u n t i e s 
had done eve ry th ing t h e y cou ld t o g e t t h e P r o p e r t y Tax D i v i s i o n 
to i s s u e a t imely a s s e s s m e n t . Id. a t f 26. 
The Utah Supreme Court r e v e r s e d and found t h a t i t would no t 
be i r r a t i o n a l or u n j u s t t o app ly t h e l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d b e c a u s e 
the P r o p e r t y Tax D i v i s i o n c l e a r l y had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o make a 
t imely assessment . Beaver County, 2006 UT a t 5 2 8 . The c o u r t 
concluded t h a t " [ w ] h i l e t h i s outcome may seem h a r s h i n t h a t i t 
depr ives t h e Count ies of an o p p o r t u n i t y t o l i t i g a t e any c l a im .to 
the t a x revenue , i t i s t h e n e c e s s a r y r e s u l t of h a v i n g l i m i t a t i o n s 
pe r iods and the accompanying b e n e f i t of f i n a l i t y f o r which t h e s e 
and s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n s have been v i o l a t e d . i t c l e a r l y does not 
make t h e C o u r t ' s j o b any e a s i e r when one p a r t y does n o t s u p p o r t 
any of i t s a s s e r t i o n s w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e a u t h o r i t y . 
3
 See Encompass S e r v i c e s Holding Corp, v. P r o s e r o I n c . , 2005 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 17 ( u s i n g e q u i t a b l e t o l l i n g where p l a i n t i f f 
be l i eved t h a t he was r e q u i r e d t o f i l e t h e c l a im i n h i s Bankruptcy 
a c t i o n ) . 
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statues were designed. Limitations periods exist to extinguish 
claims not acted upon; thus, the loss of a claim occurs every 
time these time limits are enforced, and such a loss is simply 
not a reason to toll the statutory period absent application of 
the discovery rule." Id. at ! 46. 
The Utah Supreme Court's application • of the limitations 
period in Beaver County is more harsh to the counties than 
application of the periods to Mayflower is in this case. 
Mayflower's complaint filed in federal district court was filed 
under diversity jurisdiction and its sole cause of action was for 
violation of the Utah Code. Mayflower should have known that 
there was at least a possibility that the federal court would 
abstain from hearing the matter in favor of a state court. Land 
use matters are certainly traditionally state concerns. State 
courts are not forbidden from entertaining constitutional claims 
of discrimination either. Mayflower should have also known it 
was taking a risk where the limitations period was only 30 days. 
Nevertheless, Mayflower chose to take that risk and file in • 
federal district court. Although it may now seem, harsh to 
deprive Mayflower of its opportunity to have its claims heard, 
the claim seeks a review of action by the county. This court is 
bound to follow the law as set out by statute and the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
Moreover, even if this court could find that Mayflower's 
-11-
circumstances are "exceptional," Mayflower's claims could still 
not be brought because it failed to exhaust its administrative 
remedies.4 Section 10-9-1001(1) states that u[n]o person may 
challenge in district court a municipality's land use decisions 
made under this chapter or under the regulation made under 
authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted his 
administrative remedies." Section 10-9-704 (1) (a) (I) further 
provides that "any . . . person . . . adversely affected by a 
decision administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance may 
appeal that decision applying the zoning ordinance by alleging 
that there is error in any order, requirement, decision, or 
determination made by an official in the administration or 
interpretation of the zoning ordinance." 
Mayflower's entire claim is that it was adversely affected 
by Park City's decision not to enforce its zoning ordinance 
properly and require United Park to provide access to 
Mayflower's property.5 Because Mayflower's allegations involve a 
4Although this matter was not briefed by the parties, it was 
argued at oral argument. Moreover, the plain error doctrine 
allows this Court to correct obvious errors. See State v. 
Morrision, 937 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (reversing 
conviction because trial court did not sua sponte prevent 
improper testimony from coming in as evidence). 
5At oral argument, Mayflower contended that since it was not 
seeking an application to develop its own property, but simply 
asking that Park City enforce its zoning ordinance and require 
United Park to provide access to Mayflower's property, there was 
no decision to appeal. However, the statute allows appeals of 
"any . . . decision . . . made by an official in the 
-12-
municipal decision administering a zoning ordinance, Mayflower 
was obligated to appeal that decision prior to filing a petition 
in the district court. Mayflower has not pled that it ever filed 
such an appeal and therefore it is barred from alleging a 
violation of § 10-9-405. 
Therefore, for the above reasons, United Park's Motion to 
Dismiss is hereby GRANTED.6 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the Court and no other 
order is required. 
DATED this __J day of C ' ( ^ ^ , 2006. 
administration . . . of the zoning ordinance." UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§ 10-9-704(1)(a)(I). This is clearly broad enough to include 
Park City's refusal to enforce the ordinance. 
6
 United Park also filed a motion to strike Mayflower's 
opposition memorandum alleging that Mayflower violated this 
Court's July 5, 2006 order. Whatever technical violation might 
have occurred, this court does not find that striking Mayflower's 
response is necessary and the response was fully considered in 
this Court's decision. United Park's motion to strike is DENIED. 
-13-
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SIS 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
SHOTTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN 
FONDS and SHOTTING MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FONDS, Netherlands 
associations, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION, EAST WEST 
PARTNERS, and UNITED PARK CITY 
MINES CO., a Delaware corporation, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO AMEND AND 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
CaseNo.2:05-CV-525TS 
This matter came before the Court for oral argument on a number of motions on April 10, 
2006. For the reasons stated at the hearing, the Court denied United Park City Mines' ("United") 
Motions to Strike. The Court also denied United's Motion for Sanctions. The Court heard 
argument on, and took under advisement, Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss. For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and 
will grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
1 
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L BACKGROUND 
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that they are owners of land called the Marsac Lode 
in Park City, Utah. This land has been included in an eighty-four acre development zone called 
the Mountain Village. The rest of the land in the Mountain Village belongs to United or East 
West Partners, Previously, the Mountain Village has been accessible by State Road 224 ("SR 
224"). In 2002, Plaintiffs allege that United relocated SR 224 so that it now bisects Plaintiffs' 
land, severing the southeastern two acres from the rest of the land. United then dedicated SR 224 
to the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT"). Plaintiffs state that they are in 
negotiations with UDOT regarding acquisition of title to maintain SR 224. As a result of this 
new construction of SR 224, Plaintiffs allege that the southeast portion of their land is 
inaccessible, except through the property of United. 
On May 25,2005, the Park City Planning Commission, over Plaintiffs' objections, 
approved the subdivision of United Js land adjoining Plaintiffs' land on the southeast. This 
subdivision is known as the Village at Empire Pass (Pod A) West Side. On May 26, 2005, the 
City Council of Park City, again over the objections of Plaintiffs, approved that subdivision. As 
a result, Plaintiffs allege that their land has been rendered inaccessible and they are unable to 
develop it Plaintiffs allege violations of § 15-73-4 of the Park City Land Management Code1 
and § 10-9-405(2) of Utah Code Annotated.2 Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that Park 
^Proposed Streets shall be extended to the boundary lines of the tract to be subdivided, 
unless prevented by topography or other physical conditions, or unless in the opinion of the 
Planning Commission such an extension is not necessary for the coordination of the layout of the 
Subdivision with the existing layout of the most advantageous future development of adjoining 
tracts." 
2
"The legislative body shall ensure that the regulations are uniform for each class or kind 
of buildings throughout each zoning district, but the regulations in one zone may differ from 
2 
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City's approval of United's Village at Empire Pass (Pod A) West Side Subdivision violated 
Plaintiffs' rights under the above-named provisions. 
E. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND 
Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Amend their Amended Complaint They seek to add 
claims that Defendants' actions violate Section 1 of the 14th Amendment and Sections 7 and 24 
of Article 1 of the Utah Constitution. Plaintiffs also seek to add a claim for damages in the 
amount of $2.5 million. They do so in an apparent attempt to bolster their claim that this Court 
should exercise jurisdiction over this matter. The Court is not persuaded. For the reasons 
discussed below, the Court will abstain and will dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint without 
prejudice to its filing in state court. Plaintiffs proposed amendments do not change this outcome. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend is denied. 
HI. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS3 
Although not styled as such, the Court finds that Defendant United's Motion to Dismiss 
is better considered a Motion for Abstention under Burford v. Sun Oil Co.4 "Abstention from the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule."5 "Burford-ty$$ abstention is 
those in other zones." 
3Defendant United has filed a Motion to Dismiss in which Defendants Park City and East 
West Partners have joined. The Court will refer to these Motions as a single Motion to Dismiss. 
4319 U.S. 315 (1943). Plaintiffs argue that abstention is inappropriate and direct the 
Court to the case of Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995). That case, however, does 
not address abstention under Burford, but rather another abstention doctrine found in Brillhart v. 
Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942) and Colorado River Water Conservation DisL 
v. United States, 242 U.S. 800 (1976). Therefore, Wilton is inapposite here. 
"Colorado River Water Conservation DisL v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976). 
3 
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deference by a federal court in order to avoid needlessly interfering in state activities." The 
Supreme Court has stated that 
Burford allows a federal court to dismiss a case only if it presents difficult 
questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial import whose 
importance transcends the results in the case then at bar or if its adjudication in a 
federal forum would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy 
with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.7 
"Ultimately, what is at stake is a federal court's decision, based on a careful consideration of the 
federal interest in retaining jurisdiction over the dispute and the competing concern for the 
independence of state action, that the State's interests are paramount and that a dispute would 
best be adjudicated in a state forum."8 "This equitable decision balances the strong federal 
interest in having certain classes of cases, and certain federal rights, adjudicated in federal court, 
against the State's interest in maintaining uniformity in the treatment of an essentially local 
problem."9 
In Burford, the Supreme Court considered whether a federal court should have 
entertained an action attacking the validity of an order of the Texas Railroad Commission 
granting Burford a permit to drill certain oil wells.10 The state's scheme for regulating oil and 
gas drilling was extremely complex and, in an effort to avoid confusion, the state legislature 
"Walker Operating Corp. v. F.RR.C, 874 R2d 1320,1330 (10th Cir. 1989). 
"Quakenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 726-27 (1996) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
*Id. at 728 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
9Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
10319 U.S. at 316-17. 
4 
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limited initial review of a decision by the Texas Railroad Commission to a single district court.11 
As a result of the system that the state had established, the Court held that federal courts should 
abstain from hearing cases challenging orders of the Texas Railroad Commission12 
Here, the state has set up a complex and comprehensive set of land use regulations under 
Utah's Municipal Land Use Development Management Act ("MLUDMA"). Part of the 
MLUDMA establishes a process whereby a party aggrieved by a municipal planning or zoning 
decision may file a petition for review with the district court/3 Since this is a state statute, the 
Court finds that the reference to "district court" in this statute is to a state district court, not a 
federal district court. 
Additionally, land use and zoning laws are quintessential areas of state and local 
concern.14 As the numerous cases cited by United indicate, federal courts should be wary of 
entering into local land use disputes and should not sit as a zoning board of appeal.15 Because of 
these considerations, any adjudication of these issues in a federal forum would be disruptive of 
state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.16 
nId. at 318-26. 
12Id. at 333-34. 
13Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(2)(a). 
"FE.RC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,768 n.30 (1982). 
"Norton v. Village ofCoirales, 103 F.3d 928, 930 (10th Cir. 1996); Spencev. 
Zimmerman, 873 R2d 256, 262 (11th Cir. 1989); Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 
844 R2d 461,467 (7th Cir. 1988); Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 832 
n.9 (1st Cir. 1982); Construction Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City ofPetaluma, 522 F.2d 
897, 906 (9th Cir. 1975). 
"Quakenbush, 517 U.S. at 726-27. 
5 
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After careful consideration of the federal and state interests at issue here, the Court finds that the 
state's interests are paramount and that this dispute would best be adjudicated in a state forum.17 
Therefore, the Court will invoke the doctrine of abstention under Burford and dismiss this case 
without prejudice to its filing in state court. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is therefore 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend (Docket No. 41) is DENIED. It is further 
ORDERED that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Docket Nos. 27, 33, and 34) are 
GRANTED. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice to its filing in state 
court. 
The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case forthwith. 
DATED April 11, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
TED STEWART 
states District Judge 
'Id. at 728. 
6 
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shall be buried in any land, or left or 
deposited on any Lot or Street at the time of 
issuance of a certificate of occupancy, and 
removal of same shall be required prior to 
issuance of any certificate of occupancy on a 
Subdivision, nor shall any be left or 
deposited in any Area of the Subdivision at 
the time of expiration of the performance 
bond or dedication of public improvements, 
whichever is sooner. 
(K) FENCING Each Applicant and/or 
Developer shall be required to furnish and 
install Fences wherever the Planning 
Commission determines upon the 
recommendation of the Community 
Development Director that a hazardous 
condition may exist. The Fences shall be 
constructed according to standards to be 
established by the City Engineer and shall be 
noted as to height and material on the Final 
Plat. No certificate of occupancy shall be 
issued until said Fence improvements have 
been duly installed. 
15-7.3-4. ROAD REQUIREMENTS 
AND DESIGN. 
(A) LAYOUT REQUIREMENTS. 
(1) GENERAL LAYOUT 
REQUIREMENTS. 
(a) Roads shall be graded 
and improved and conform to 
the Park City Design 
Standards, Construction 
Specifications, and Standard 
Drawings and shall be 
approved as to design and 
specifications by the City 
Engineer, in accordance with 
the construction plans 
required to be submitted prior 
to Final Plat approval. Prior 
to Final Plat approval the 
Public Works Director and 
the Community Development 
Director shall make the 
determination as to whether 
each Street is to be public or 
private. Such status shall be 
shown on the plat. 
(b) The rigid rectangular 
gridiron Street pattern need 
not necessarily be adhered to, 
and the use of curvilinear 
Streets, Cul-de-sacs, orU-
shaped Streets shall be 
encouraged where such use 
will result in a more desirable 
layout. 
(c) In business and 
industrial Developments, the 
Streets and other Access 
ways shall be planned in 
connection with the grouping 
of Buildings, location of rail 
facilities, and the provision of 
alleys, truck loading and 
maneuvering Areas, and 
walks and parking Areas so 
as to minimize conflict of 
movement between the 
various types of traffic, 
including pedestrian. 
ARK CITY MUNICIPAL CODE - TITLE 15 LMC, Chapter 7.3 - Requirements for 
Improvements, Reservations, and Design 15-7.3-8 
(d) Proposed Streets shall 
be extended to the boundary 
lines of the tract to be 
subdivided, unless prevented 
by topography or other 
physical conditions, or unless 
in the opinion of the Planning 
Commission such an 
extension is not necessary for 
the coordination of the layout 
of the Subdivision with the 
existing layout or the most 
advantageous future 
Development of adj acent 
tracts. 
(2) FRONTAGE ON AND 
ARRANGEMENT TO 
IMPROVED ROADS. 
(a) No Subdivision shall 
be approved unless the Area 
to be subdivided has Frontage 
on and Access from an 
existing Street on the Streets 
Master Plan unless such 
Street is an existing state or 
county highway; or a Street 
shown upon a plat approved 
by the Planning Commission 
and recorded in the County 
Recorder's office. Such 
Street or highway must be 
suitably improved as required 
by the highway rules, 
regulations, specifications, or 
orders, or be secured by a 
performance Guarantee 
required under these 
Subdivision regulations, with 
the width and Right-of-Way 
required by these Subdivision 
regulations or the Streets 
Master Plan. 
Wherever the Area to be 
subdivided is to utilize 
existing road Frontage, such 
road shall be suitably 
improved as provided 
hereinabove. 
(b) All Streets shall be 
properly integrated with the 
existing and proposed system 
of thoroughfares and 
dedicated Rights-of-Way as 
established in the Streets 
Master Plan. 
(c) All thoroughfares 
shall be properly related to 
specific traffic generators 
such as industries, business 
districts, schools, churches, 
and shopping centers; to 
population densities; and to 
the pattern of existing, 
proposed, and future land 
uses. 
(3) ROAD ARRANGEMENT 
IN RELATION TO 
TOPOGRAPHY. 
(a) Roads shall be related 
appropriately to the 
topography. Local roads may 
be curved to avoid 
conformity of Lot appearance 
and to discourage through 
traffic. All Streets shall be 
arranged so as to obtain as 
many as possible of the 
p ARK CITY MUNICIPAL CODE Procedures TITLE 15 LMC, Chapter 1 - General Provisions and 15-1-15 
15-1 -15. PENALTIES. 
Any Person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, and the principals or Agents 
thereof violating or causing the violation of 
•this LMC shall be guilty of a Class "C" 
misdemeanor and punished upon conviction 
by a fine and/or imprisonment described in 
the current Park City Criminal Code. In 
addition, the City shall be entitled to bring a 
civil action to enjoin and/or abate the 
continuation of the violation. 
Private citizens of Park City or Property 
Owners have the right to file actions to 
enjoin the continuation of a violation 
affecting their interests, provided that the 
plaintiff in such action gives notice of the 
action to the City Recorder prior to filing the 
action. 
15-1 -16. LICENSING. 
Licenses or permits issued in violation of 
this LMC are null and void. 
15-1-17. 
RIGHTS 
VESTING OF ZONING 
(A) Upon submittal of a Complete 
Application, the Application shall vest 
pursuant to the terms of the LMC and 
Zoning Map in effect at the time of filing the 
Complete Application. 
(B) Vesting of all Permits and approvals 
terminates upon the expiration or 
termination of the permit or approval. 
(C) EXCEPTIONS. Applications shall 
not vest: 
(1) when revisions to the LMC 
are pending at the time of 
Application which would prohibit or 
further condition the approval 
sought; or 
(2) when there exists a 
compelling and countervailing 
health, safety or welfare reason for 
applying the pending standard. 
15-1-18. APPEALS AND 
RECONSIDERATION PROCESS. 
(A) STAFF. Any decision by the 
Community Development Director 
regarding Application of this LMC to a 
Property may be appealed to the Planning 
Commission. Decisions regarding 
compliance with the Historic District 
Guidelines may be appealed to the Historic 
District Commission. The appeal must be 
filed with the Community Development 
Department. There shall be no additional 
notice for appeal of the staff determination 
other than listing the matter on the agenda, 
unless notice of the staff review" was 
provided in which case the same notice must 
be given for the appeal. 
(B) HISTORIC DISTRICT 
COMMISSION (HDC). Final Actions by 
the Historic District Commission may be 
appealed to the Board of Adjustment. 
(C) PLANNING COMMISSION. 
Final Actions by the Planning Commission 
on staff appeals may be appealed to the 
Board of Adjustment Final Action by the 
Planning Commission on Conditional Use 
permits and MPDs may be appealed to the 
City Council. 
ARK CITY MUNICIPAL CODE -
Procedures 
(D) STANDING TO APPEAL. The 
following has standing to appeal a Final 
Action: 
(1) Any Person who submitted 
written comment or testified on a 
proposal before the Community 
Development Department, Historic 
District Commission or Planning 
Commission; 
(2) The Owner of any Property 
within three hundred feet (3 00') of 
the boundary of the subject site; 
(3) Any City official, Board or 
Commission having jurisdiction over 
the matter; and 
(4) The Owner of the subject 
Property. 
(E) TIMING. All appeals must be made 
within ten (10) calendar days of the Final 
Action. The reviewing body, with the 
consultation of the appellant, shall set a date 
for the appeal. 
(F) FORM OF APPEALS. Appeals to 
the Planning Commission or Board of 
Adjustment must be filed with the 
Community Development Department. 
Appeals to the City Council must be filed 
with the City Recorder. Appeals must be by 
letter or petition, and must contain the name, 
address, and telephone number of the 
petitioner; his or her relationship to the 
project or subject Property; and must have a 
comprehensive statement of all the reasons 
for the appeal, including specific provisions 
of the law, if known, that are alleged to be 
violated by the action taken. 
15 LMC, Chapter 1 - General Provisions and 
15-1-16 
(G) WRITTEN FINDINGS 
REQUIRED. The appellate body shall 
direct staff to prepare detailed written: 
(1) Findings of Fact which 
explain and support the Staff 
decision; 
(2) Conclusions as to how a 
contrary decision would violate the 
provisions of this LMC, other City 
ordinances, or applicable state or 
federal laws or regulations. 
(H) CITY COUNCIL ACTION ON 
APPEALS. 
(1) The City Council, with the 
consultation of the appellant, shall 
set a date for the appeal. 
(2) The City Recorder shall 
notify the Owner of the appeal date. 
The City Recorder shall obtain the 
findings, conclusions and all other 
pertinent information from the 
Community Development 
Department and shall transmit them 
to the Council. 
